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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-4532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM FLORENCE,
Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 2-08-cr-00697-002)
District Judge: Hon. Joel H. Slomsky

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 5, 2010
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 8, 2010)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
William Florence appeals an October 21, 2009, judgment of sentence of the
District Court. He contends that the District Court plainly erred by imposing a special
condition of supervised release that prohibits him from incurring any new credit charges

or opening additional lines of credit without the approval of a probation officer. For the
following reasons, we will affirm the sentence the District Court imposed.
I. Background
Law enforcement agents arrested Florence on October 23, 2008, after observing
him delivering phencyclidine (PCP) to Terrence Savage. The agents later made three
controlled-drug purchases from Savage through a confidential informant. In each
instance, Florence served as Savage’s supplier. When Florence was arrested, he had an
additional quantity of PCP on him and roughly $2,700 of “buy-money” that the informant
had given Savage moments beforehand. The total amount of PCP involved in Florence
and Savage’s transactions was 614.03 grams
Florence moved to suppress the evidence seized from him when he was arrested.
At the suppression hearing, Florence falsely testified that he was not involved in drug
transactions with his co-defendant, Savage, on the date in question. The District Court
denied the motion to suppress and Florence subsequently pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(b)(1)(B); one count of distribution of 100 grams or more of PCP, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); two counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of 100
grams or more of PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. §
2; and one count of possession with intent to distribute PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). (Appellant’s App. at 3-4.)
At the sentencing hearing on October 21, 2009, the District Court carefully
considered the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining the appropriate
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sentence to impose. In discussing Florence’s criminal conduct, the District Court
evaluated Florence’s drug revenue, which, from the transactions in the record, the District
Court calculated to be approximately $8,000 over a one-month period. Florence also
presented, and the court addressed, Florence’s legal sources of income. At a number of
points during the hearing, the District Court expressed its concern regarding Florence’s
lack of truthfulness, as it was clear that Florence had lied in his testimony to the court
during the suppression hearing.
The District Court imposed a sentence of seventy-five months’ imprisonment, a
term within the Sentencing Guidelines range that the District Court had calculated. The
District Court also imposed a five-year term of supervised release, a special assessment
of $500, and a number of special conditions of supervised release. Among the special
conditions, the District Court required Florence to provide the U.S. Probation Office with
full disclosure of his financial records, including truthful monthly statements of his
income and yearly tax returns. The District Court also directed Florence “not to incur
any new credit charges or open any additional lines of credit without the approval of the
Probation Officer.” The court, however, did not impose a fine or restitution, beyond the
special assessment. Florence did not object to these terms.
Florence appealed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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We generally review a district court’s imposition of sentence, including conditions
of supervised release, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139,
143 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007). If the sentence was imposed without objection, we review for
plain error. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 143 n.1.
III. Discussion
Florence challenges only the District Court’s imposition of the special condition of
supervised release, prohibiting him from incurring new credit charges or opening new
lines of credit without the approval of the probation office.
“Though district courts have broad discretion in fashioning special conditions of
supervised release, this discretion is not unfettered,” and must be exercised according to
18 U.S.C. § 3583. United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 405 (3d Cir. 2010). Section
3583(d) requires, inter alia, that any such condition of supervised release: (1) “must be
‘reasonably related’ to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and (2) “must impose
‘no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to deter future criminal
conduct, protect the public, and rehabilitate the defendant.” Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). Although we “‘have consistently required district courts
to set forth factual findings to justify special probation conditions,’” id. at 144 (quoting
United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999)), “we may affirm the
condition if we can ascertain any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the record before
the District Court,” United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted).
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Florence argues that his drug offenses are unrelated to any fraud or financial
impropriety and therefore cannot support the financial restrictions the District Court
imposed. Florence refers to Section 5D1.3(d)(2) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, which recommends the imposition of the instant special condition
with a limitation that the condition only apply if a defendant fails to pay on time any fine
or restitution. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(d)(2) (2008). Noting
that the limitation present in 5D1.3(d)(2) is absent here and that no restitution or fine has
been imposed, Florence asserts that, at a minimum, the lack of explanation for this
special condition requires us to remand this case to the District Court.
On the record before us, we conclude that the District Court did not commit plain
error in imposing the special condition preventing Florence from incurring new credit
charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval of a probation officer. This
condition serves as a strong deterrent and monitoring tool, particularly since Florence’s
drug transactions are inextricably linked to his finances and since he is of dubious
credibility. 1 Thus, there is a viable basis for the condition in the record. See Miller, 594
F.3d at 184. Moreover, even if the imposition of this special condition was error, it was
not plain error. 2

1

A better explanation by the District Court for the special condition would have
facilitated our review of this ground for appeal.
2

Florence’s attempts to analogize his special condition to those in Pruden and
Evans are unavailing. See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1998). In Pruden, a special condition
requiring defendant’s participation in a mental health treatment program constituted plain
error because there was no evidence that defendant had any mental health issues, and in
5

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence of the District
Court.

turn, no need for such treatment. See 398 F.3d at 249. In Evans, a condition requiring
reimbursement of counsel fees was “not related in any tangible way to [defendant’s]
insurance fraud,” and amounted to plain error. See 155 F.3d at 249.
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